𝓤𝓷𝓲𝓽𝓮𝓭 𝓝𝓮𝔀𝓼

There is a dangerous pattern in British politics: we respond in crisis, then forget in calm. The UK Covid-19 Inquiry is laying bare just how costly that instinct can be. Its findings are stark. The NHS was pushed “close to collapse”, with hospitals overwhelmed, staff stretched beyond endurance, routine care delayed, and lives lost that might otherwise have been saved. This was not simply bad luck. It was the consequence of ignoring repeated recommendations from studies, reports and even a pandemic simulation exercise in October 2016 which concluded the NHS would be overwhelmed.

Inquiry chair Baroness Hallett has been clear – the pandemic exposed deep structural weaknesses, not just in how we responded to Covid-19, but in our broader readiness for health emergencies. The warning could not be more explicit. The question is whether we are listening.

Yet at the very moment we should be absorbing these lessons, Ministers are moving in the opposite direction. Last week’s decision to remove the UK’s contribution to the Pandemic Fund, as a consequence of wider cuts to the overseas aid budget, risks dismantling precisely the systems designed to stop the next outbreak before it reaches our shores.

These are the surveillance networks that detect unusual clusters of disease. The laboratories that identify new variants. The rapid response teams that contain outbreaks before they spiral. In short, they are our early warning system.

Viruses do not respect borders. Covid-19 proved that with devastating clarity. A local outbreak, poorly understood and inadequately contained, can become a global emergency in a matter of weeks. The inquiry has already underscored a painful truth. Delayed action costs lives. Acting early is not just preferable, it is decisive.

Ironically, the funding cut was announced as the UK health authorities were battling to contain a meningitis outbreak among students in Kent – reminding us once again how fast a contagion and the ensuing panic can spread.

Yet by weakening Britain’s surveillance and response capabilities, we are setting ourselves up for another disaster. That is a gamble and a particularly risky one in an increasingly interconnected and unstable world. Urbanisation, climate change, and global travel all increase the likelihood and speed of disease transmission.

One person who understands this better than most is Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, director general of the World Health Organisation. He told me at a recent security conference in Baku that it is a matter of when, not if, another global pandemic strikes.

The Pandemic Fund represents decades of accumulated expertise, much of it led by Britain. It underpins vaccine development, strengthens health systems, and coordinates international responses. These are exactly the capabilities the Covid Inquiry suggests were insufficiently resourced before the last pandemic struck.

To cut them now, as the evidence of past failure is still being assembled, is to risk repeating the same mistakes. This is not about charity but national security.

Strong health systems abroad act as Britain’s first line of defence. When outbreaks are detected early and contained locally, they do not become global crises. When they are missed, ignored, or under-resourced, the consequences do not stay contained. They arrive here, at our borders, in our hospitals, and across our economy.

We have learned this the hard way.

If we dismantle the very tools designed to ensure earlier action next time, we are effectively choosing to relearn the same lesson at the same cost. There is, of course, a broader strategic context. The world is becoming more dangerous. Increasing defence spending is both necessary and overdue.

But we should not fall into the trap of thinking security can be measured only in tanks, ships, and aircraft. None of this hard power can deter a virus, contain extremism, manage mass migration, or prevent state fragility. These challenges require investment in resilience, stability and international cooperation – the very things that fall under the banner of so-called soft power. Cutting that capability is a false economy.

When prevention fails, the costs multiply. The NHS comes under pressure. The economy slows. Emergency spending dwarfs any short-term savings. Most importantly, lives are lost. The lesson from Covid is not complicated. Preparedness matters. Early action matters. Investment in resilience matters. We do not know when the next pandemic will come. But we know it will.

The real test for Ministers is whether they act on what we have learned, or whether, once again, we drift back into complacency, only to be caught out when it matters most.

And this time, we cannot say we were not warned.

Tobias Ellwood is a former Conservative MP and chair of the Defence Select Committee from 2020 to 2023